ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE: CHAMBERLAIN, STALIN, AND THEIR FAILURE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT

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Abstract

Historiography and popular works on the origins of the Second World War in the UK often tend to concentrate on the Franco-British policy of appeasement, with particular stress on the Munich agreements. The Soviet Union appears late in this narrative, after the German invasion, with brief mentions of the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact and the ensuing economic cooperation. In particular, the failed negotiations between France and Great Britain on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, in the summer of 1939, are seldom discussed in depth. Their study should ideally include not only the negotiations themselves but the wider mutual views, mistrust, conflicts of interests, and differing perceptions of how to confront a rising Germany. Ideally, future historical scholarship should provide a more integrated view of the run up to the war, seeking to explain why London and Moscow failed to join forces despite perceiving the threat from Berlin.

Key Words
Second World War, Great Patriotic War, Chamberlain, Stalin, Molotov-Von Ribbentrop, Deterrence
Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether the standard Western interpretation of the Second World War in the European Theatre pays too much attention to British Prime Minister Chamberlain's policies, while failing to stress the significance of the failure by London and Moscow to reach an agreement in the summer of 1939. By standard interpretation we mean the narrative found in most British textbooks and other mainstream works, reflecting a certain consensus by recognized historians and other academics, resting at least in part in the memoirs and other writings by participants in the war, with Sir Winston S Churchill at their head. For the purposes of this paper, the word 'origins' will be taken in a restricted sense, to mean the causes of Hitler's decision to invade Poland, risking a declaration of war by Great Britain and France, leaving aside the deeper reasons why Germany elected him, the foundations of his political program, or the reasons for his resorting to force. The war in the Pacific, including the clash between the Soviet Union and Mongolia, on one side, and Japan on the other, at Nomonhan / Khalkhin-Gol, and the connections between events in that theatre and those in Europe, will be left out of this paper. Our study of historical facts will be amoral, in the sense that we will not seek to judge Chamberlain or Stalin, only to determine whether their actions, or lack thereof, may have facilitated the outbreak of the war. The geographical scope of our enquiry will be limited to Europe, and to the following three actors: Great Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union. Although others were of course involved, this narrow focus is meant to concentrate on the key issue of whether it was the failure by London and Moscow to reach an agreement which ultimately precipitated the descent into war in two stages, in 1939 and 1941. Concerning both Stalin and Chamberlain, we will dispense with any discussion of the role of others in the Soviet and British leaderships, treating them as all powerful figures. Although in the case of Chamberlain, this was not the case, again the reason is to stay focused.

The paper begins with an outline of the standard Western, and in particular British, interpretation of the origins of the Second World War in Europe. Next we will consider whether it pays most attention to Chamberlain's actions and policies other than his failure to reach an accommodation with Stalin. Having determined this to be the case, the paper's attention will turn to two issues. First, whether the policies of each leader justify the different amount of attention paid by many historical works, which focus on the British prime minister. Second, if so, the possible reasons for this. The paper will prove that the standard British interpretation devotes indeed an inordinate amount of attention to Chamberlain's policies and actions other than his half-hearted attempt to reach an agreement with Stalin, and the latter's corresponding failure to successfully push for an understanding with Great Britain. Both leaders

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appear to have made an insufficient effort to forge an alliance, although there were factors on each side at least partly explaining this.

The standard British interpretation: a brief summary

Concerning Chamberlain, the standard interpretation would be that the British prime minister was slow to realize Hitler’s true nature, hoping that by granting him a number of key concessions he would refrain from the use of force and the balance of power in the Continent would be preserved. Acting under a certain sense of guilt from the Versailles Treaty, economic pressure not to rearm, the memory of the carnage in the trenches, ‘a fundamental fear and hatred of combat and its consequences’\(^2\), fear of air attacks, and a feeling that Hitler’s targets were far away pieces of real state not amounting to a vital interest for Great Britain, he was reluctant to confront the dictator. Even at that time, wishful thinking prevailed, in the sense that it was thought that a mere declaration of war, despite no actual troops on the ground or meaningful support for Poland, would suffice to deter Hitler, prompt a coup in Germany, or provide ample time for mobilization in the West.\(^3\)

With regard to Stalin, in this narrative he is a junior figure. First of all, in discussing the post-First World War crisis in Germany he does not appear, not having been one of the fathers of Versailles. Next, in examining the failure of collective security and the League of Nations, the USSR is again absent, not being a member. His views on, and reaction to, Germany’s takeover of the Rhineland and Austria, are barely mentioned. The fact that Poland was invaded by both Germany and the Soviet Union is often overlooked or dealt with most cursorily, and the reader is left with just a shallow and late entry of the Soviet giant into the picture, usually in the form of the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop pact, the Winter War, and Stalin’s refusal to believe the intelligence about German preparations for invasion.

Chamberlain, Stalin, and standard historiography

Many historical works devote much more attention to Chamberlain than to Stalin, and furthermore fail to stress the central issue of the failed negotiations between London and Moscow in the summer of 1939. In some cases this goes as far as simply not mentioning Stalin and the negotiations at all when explaining the road to war. Although it may perhaps be excused for its brevity, a good example could be the catalogue of the Imperial War Museum, which in its ‘The


Inter-War Years’ section does not mention the USSR or her leader at all, furthermore its reference to the invasion of Poland simply explains ‘the German invasion’ of the country, with not a single word on the fate of its Eastern regions.\(^4\) A few pages later the first reference to the Soviet Union appears, in the shape of Operation Barbarossa, with again not a single word of what went on before the German attack.\(^5\)

In many popular works, a similar approach can be observed. An example could be the *Handbook of World War II*, by Karen Farrington, which in its first chapter, devoted to the origins of the war and the conflict until the fall of France, fails to mention Stalin or the Soviet Union. Concerning the invasion of Poland, the fate of her Eastern regions is omitted, and only Paris’ and London's response is noted: 'This time Britain and France refused to sit back and watch their ally being dismembered by Hitler'.\(^6\) It is not until a later chapter dealing with Operation Barbarossa that the Soviet leader appears, and although the impact of his military purges and failure to overrun the Finns is duly noted, the non-aggression pact with Germany is presented as something 'out of the blue', which 'Stalin guessed it would at least buy him time before his country became involved in a war it neither wanted nor could afford'. Although the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland is then mentioned, and Stalin's refusal to head 'As many as 76 different warnings' about Germany's intentions stressed, still the overall approach is to see the Soviet Union mainly as a passive victim, as the title of the chapter, 'Barbarossa - Target Russia' makes clear.\(^7\)

Thus, instead of critically discussing Stalin's policy towards a resurgent Germany, as the book does with regard to Chamberlain, and examine the failure by Great Britain and the Soviet Union to reach an agreement, the Soviet leader is simply presented as yet another of Hitler's victims. The Second World War is basically explained as having arisen from a combination of Hitler's ambitions and Chamberlain's appeasement policy, with the French in a minor, supporting role. The complex web of diplomacy, deterrence, security concerns, and mistrust, covering the whole of the European Continent in the run up to the war, is absent. The connections between British and Soviet policy, and the mutual views in London and Moscow, are not considered. In a way, the triangle London-Berlin-Moscow is reduced to two largely independent bilateral relationships.

More academic books usually go into greater detail and do not offer such radically separate treatment of the 1939 German attack on Poland and Anglo-French declaration of war on the one hand, and Operation Barbarossa on the other, but they do not often provide an integrated analyses either.

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\(^4\) Imperial War Museum London (London: Imperial War Museum, 2009), p. 31  
\(^5\) Imperial War Museum, p. 41  
\(^7\) Farrington, *Handbook of World War II*, pp. 30-37
Stalin’s policy toward Hitler

Having summed up how Chamberlain reacted to Hitler’s rise to power, rearmament, and aggressive foreign policy, it is now the turn to analyse Stalin’s approach those same years, while comparing it to the British Prime Minister’s. This will help us better understand some of the causes that made it difficult for Great Britain and the Soviet Union to coordinate their responses to German expansionism.

First of all we must note that ‘For Stalin, as had been true for Lenin before him, the primary aim of Soviet security policy was to stay clear of entanglement in conflicts between capitalist powers’. 8 This reflected a deep mistrust of the West, its institutions, its values, its socio-economic and political system, and on top of that its real or alleged threats to the very existence of the Soviet Union. Not even 20 years had passed since the end of the Russian Civil War and the withdrawal of the lasts foreign contingents from its territory, and the Munich Crisis. While there was a complex, and to this day controversial, relationship among Russian nationalism, ideology, and national security considerations in Stalin’s mind, all these factors seem to have militated against the chances of a successful conclusion to the half-hearted attempts at negotiations with Great Britain in the run up to the war. Furthermore, on observing Hitler’s rise Stalin may easily have been tempted to expect the Soviet Union to benefit from the resulting strife, with some authors going as far as suggesting that he was preparing a pre-emptive strike against Germany (based among other factors on troop dispositions and his 05 May 1941 speech to military officers). This could go hand in hand with fear of an attack by Hitler, and as so many assumptions of the time it rested on faith in the strength of French military might. In any case, on learning of the Anglo-French declaration of war, Stalin told Molotov and Zhdanov ‘We see nothing wrong in their having a good hard fight and weakening each other’. 9 His mistrust of the West continued, and for example Churchill’s warning about an impending German attack was met by Stalin with suspicion.10

An important difference between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, with regard to the German threat, was that whereas British national security rested on the maintenance of the balance of power in the Continent, along London’s traditional foreign policy line towards Europe, and thus required no territorial gains, the Soviet Union felt herself vulnerable due to the proximity of some of her biggest cities and industrial centres to her borders and therefore felt the need to expand, with the Baltic countries plus some areas in Finland as the

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10 Montefiore, Stalin, pp. 356-357
main objective. Stalin felt that it was difficult to defend the USSR without gaining additional strategic depth. We can therefore say that while Chamberlain's appeasement was defensive and collective in nature, Stalin's was offensive and bilateral. Here we are not using the word “offensive” in any negative way, although of course the countries laying between Berlin and Moscow may have felt it that way. What we mean is that Moscow felt the need to gain territory in order to improve his defensive dispositions, whereas London could expect naval strength and the French Army to act as bulwarks against Nazi Germany.

In a way Hitler was also keenly aware of the differences between the British and the Soviet posture. He hoped for a settlement with Great Britain even after the fall of France, while he always saw the USSR as a mortal enemy which sooner or later would have to be tackled. Conversely, Chamberlain convinced himself that Hitler would be true to his word, and could not believe the German leader would choose war, while Stalin was more realistic concerning the ultimate turn of events, despite imposing his views that an attack would not come in 1941.

This perceived Soviet need for extra territory meant that an alternative policy, of supporting strong independent states on the belt of land between the Baltic and the Black Sea, setting up a buffer zone between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia, was never a realistic proposition. This was on the other hand what, however timidly, London and Paris were pushing for. The resulting discrepancy goes a long way in explaining why no serious negotiations ever took place between Stalin and Chamberlain.

Furthermore, for Stalin Poland was an artificial and illegitimate state, born out of Versailles. Therefore, his approach to the country could not have been in starker contrast than that by the British leader. Whereas London had a stake in the preservation of existing states and borders (when the principle of self-determination could not be invoked, as was the case in the Rhineland and Austria), the same could not be said about Moscow. Also, Stalin was obsessed about restoring Imperial Russia's old territory. Thus, in his quest for this extra space, be it in search of additional strategic depth or in a bid to restore Imperial Russia's borders, (and there is no reason why both could not be in his mind side by side), he may have not paid enough attention to Germany's growing military might, and to the fact that modern developments in warfare, in particular the tank and the airplane, made territory still valuable but not as essential as in the past, when warfare was two-dimensional and land formations could only move much more slowly. The additional territory gained by conquest before

12 Olson, *Troublesome Young Men*, p. 92
13 ‘In the eyes of both Berlin and Moscow, the Polish State owed its existence only to Allied force majeure in 1919, and had no legitimacy’ Hastings, *All Hell Let Loose*, p. 2
Operation Barbarossa may have helped the Soviet Union if used as part of a hunting ground, held by a light screen, where to counterattack with armoured formations against the panzer spearheads, in mobile warfare. However, having the Red Army concentrate in areas close to the Reich, plus depriving commanders of the necessary leeway to conduct a flexible defence, facilitated the prompt encirclement of many units and their destruction. In a way, the Soviet policy of gaining additional strategic depth may have misfired.

This does not mean, however, that it would have been easy for Stalin to follow an alternative policy. In that case, the Soviet leader would have had to deal, among other issues, with Poland’s mistrust of Russia. Warsaw was not just opposed to letting Soviet troops in, but more generally viewed Moscow with suspicion. Perhaps a way out of this conundrum would have been for Chamberlain to try to engage both Poland and the Soviet Union at the same time, instead of providing a security guarantee to the former. However everything seems to point out at the difficulty of such undertaking.

Stalin may also be seen as responsible for contributing to the ultimate breakout of the war due to his military purges, which weakened the Red Army, leading Hitler to believe that it could be decisively defeated. Compounding their impact, his failure to quickly overrun Finland reinforced that perception in the German dictator's mind. In addition, his secrecy may have helped fool Hitler as to the Red Army's true strength. Again, we can see a case of policies backfiring, since none of these three were intended to weaken the defence of the Soviet Union, and in the case of Finland it was a move explicitly intended to reinforce it. The Soviet leader also facilitated German rearmament, and more generally, economic reconstruction by trading with Berlin, in a policy which had began many years before the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop pact, ‘since 1922, when the Treaty of Rapallo established a basis of mutually beneficial economic cooperation which helped the Reichswer bypass the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty and undertake some clandestine steps towards rearmament’.

Engaging Germany, however, was a policy followed by many other powers, not just the Soviet Union. Finally, once the conflict had started, a way in which Stalin also benefited Hitler was by instructing Communists in the West to oppose the war with Germany.

**Ultimate responsibility for the failure to reach an agreement**

Rather than seeking to point the finger at London or Moscow, an alternative approach is to consider that neither Chamberlain nor Stalin are to blame in

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14 Kershaw, *Fateful Choices*, pp. 246-247 and 260
15 Service, *Stalin*, p. 408
16 Kershaw, *Fateful Choices*, p. 57
17 Hastings, *All Hell Let Loose*, p. 8
particular for their failure to stop Hitler. Both were aware of the risk of German aggression but had to labour under a number of constraints, some shared, some specific of Great Britain or the Soviet Union. These structural factors would thus ultimately doom to failure any attempt at diplomacy, regardless of the two leaders' wishes. We shall next have a look at some of these structural factors, both those affecting the two countries and those casting a shadow on one of them.

A shared obstacle during the Sudeten crisis was their inability to directly deploy troops to defend Czechoslovakia, with Poland and Romania\textsuperscript{18} hostile to the passage of Soviet troops, and Great Britain and France not yet psychologically ready to attack first.\textsuperscript{19} Stalin offered aid to Czechoslovakia before its destruction, but 'whether he was seriously intending to commit the Red Army is doubtful'.\textsuperscript{20}

On the British side, rearmament required time and was difficult to push forward in the difficult economic climate of the times, whereas on the Soviet side the main problem was not armaments per se but rather overcoming Stalin's purges and restoring some sense of stability to the Red Army.

Thus, whether or not they sincerely believed Hitler could be stopped without going to war, both Chamberlain and Stalin needed time, and time they sought, albeit separately. Chamberlain at Munich, and Stalin through the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact. Therefore, another way to answer the question of which one was more responsible, would be to say that they both were broadly equally responsible not because their individual policies were equivalent but because none went to great lengths to seek out the other and together forge a pre-war alliance against German expansionism. This could be in part the result of mutual ideological hostility\textsuperscript{21}, as well as British reluctance to see the equilibrium of power decisively tilted towards the USSR and Soviet fears that an agreement with London may bar the way to territorial aggrandisement. Neither read Hitler correctly, Chamberlain as we have already said hoped it may be possible to reach lasting agreements with him, while Stalin did not expect him to dismiss Bismarck's warning and engage in a two-front war.\textsuperscript{22} Perhaps also, they did not coordinate because each expected that Hitler would mainly be a threat to the other, at least this is how Stalin first perceived Hitler before he reached power.\textsuperscript{23} Both were also victims of deep misunderstandings, with Stalin seeing the British guarantee to Poland not as a show of resolve but rather as a threat of a second Munich leaving Hitler's armies at his doorstep.

\textsuperscript{18} H. Ragsdale, \textit{The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 76-85
\textsuperscript{20} Service, \textit{Stalin}, p. 396
\textsuperscript{21} Keegan, \textit{Second World War}, p. 43
\textsuperscript{23} Service, \textit{Stalin}, p. 384
and Chamberlain failing to see the great importance that the USSR placed on strategic depth and a free hand in the Baltics for the defence of Leningrad.24

**Why does the standard historiography neglect Stalin's policies?**

Having seen how an examination of the outbreak of the war in September 1939 demand that we look at both British and Soviet policy, it is necessary to deal with the question why much of the standard British, and generally Western, historiography seems to neglect Stalin's policies. There are a number of reasons why this may be the case, and this paper will examine some of the most significant ones.

The first, and simplest one, is that we could simple find ourselves before a case of anglocentrism, a tendency to exaggerate Great Britain's role in the war and its origins, to the detriment of other actors. We could note, with this regard, that although not to the same extent that we have observed with regard to the Soviet Union and Stalin, other countries and leaders also tend to either be overlooked or their role much diminished in many books by British authors. This is a normal phenomenon, found to some extent in any country, although historians must be aware of it and complement their readings when necessary in order to gain a well-rounded view of whatever conflict they are researching. We have to note, however, that in this particular instance there may be two different reasons for this. In addition to the natural tendency for any author to pay more attention to his own country and to primary sources in his language, we can observe in the UK a deep need, almost from the early days of the war, to atone for the past sin of appeasement. Thus, the history of the failure of Chamberlain's appeasement policy becomes a moral tale, a lesson in what should never be done again, and Stalin's potential failures are simply pushed aside as irrelevant and even a distraction to this narrative. The historian must be careful because, no matter how much in agreement he may be with the central tenet that, in Churchill's words, 'An appeaser is one that feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last', we should never lose sight of the fact that things are often a bit more complex and that it was Chamberlain himself who started to move away from his policy and who launched a rearmament program.25 That he did not have the necessary character to lead a total war is another matter.

Another explanation may be the Communist, or more widely left-wing, bias of some historians, reluctant to give the impression that they may be blaming Stalin for the outbreak of the war. Other authors may perhaps be afraid of

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24 Montefiore, *Stalin*, pp. 312-313

equating Nazi Germany with the Soviet Union, and thus inadvertently move away from any in-depth examination of the period between their non-aggression pact and Hitler's invasion. These are treacherous waters to navigate, although ideally the work of historians on that period should not preclude recognizing and highlighting the Soviet Union's essential role in the ultimate defeat of the Third Reich, just like working on Chamberlain's appeasement is no bar on recognizing and highlighting Great Britain's equally essential role.

A third possible factor would be the weight of the war time alliance with the Soviet Union. It is perhaps remarkable that the view of the Soviet Union as an ally survived the Cold War, but this is not so surprising when one realizes that news of the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact in Britain were soon superseded by the German attack on Poland and the resulting declaration of war. It is true that London did not seriously try to strike an alliance with Moscow to confront the rising Germany, but it is also true that when hostilities broke out British leaders refrained from blaming their Soviet counterparts. In Winston S Churchill's 1 October 1939 radio broadcast, where he famously described Russia as 'a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma', the then first lord of the admiralty, said that the 'key is Russian national interest' since 'It cannot be in accordance with the interest of the safety of Russia that Germany should plant itself upon the shores of the Black Sea, or that it should overrun the Balkan States and subjugate the Slavonic peoples of south eastern Europe'. As a result, Churchill proclaimed his 'conviction that the second great fact of the first month of the war is that Hitler, and all that Hitler stands for, have been and are being warned off the east and the southeast of Europe'. Now, with the Cold War over, Soviet actions in the run up to the war still remain a no go area, a red line for Moscow, and other than in certain regions like the Baltic, most historians seem little inclined to decisively challenge the official Russian interpretation of events.

A fourth reason, and this is particularly relevant if we take the First and the Second World Wars to be stages of a single wider conflict, may be that while Great Britain had a first-class role in the 1919 settlement, Russia was unable to resist Germany and ended up signing a separate peace, followed by diplomatic isolation under her new, Communist, regime. Thus an integrated approach to last century's two greatest conflicts may facilitate a fixation with Chamberlain to the detriment of Stalin.

Finally, and this may be linked to the second variant of the first possible explanation, leaving Stalin aside may facilitate a narrative of the Second World War as a great conflict between democracy and dictatorship. This is a narrative already overshadowed by the war-time alliance with the USSR, and which would have suffered even more if the road to the war had had to be explained in more complex ways, introducing a third actor. Concerning this, we should

also take into account the impact of the Cold War,\textsuperscript{27} with both sides employing history as part of their public diplomacy and soft power battles, which included working to blame the other for the outbreak of the Second World War. An early US hit was the publication, in 1948, of a volume of documents on Nazi-Soviet relations\textsuperscript{28} from captured German files\textsuperscript{29}, with the Soviet Union striking back with the publication of “Falsificators of History”\textsuperscript{30}, which accused Washington of having provided capital for Germany’s rearmament while accusing London and Paris of encouraging Hitler to look east.

Conclusions

Our examination of the standard British explanation of the origins of the Second World War confirms that Chamberlain’s policies and role receive indeed much more attention than Stalin’s, and that, furthermore, the failed attempt by London and Moscow to reach an understanding in the summer of 1939 is not a central aspect of most popular and academic narratives. Whereas London’s response to the Munich crisis and more generally the British policy of appeasement are widely seen as having ultimately led to war, despite the good intentions of their proponents, Stalin’s approach to a resurgent Germany (which similarly sought to buy time) is set aside and often the Soviet leader does not enter the picture until much later, either when his country is invaded or in the months prior to Operation Barbarossa.

The Soviet reaction to Nazi designs is often portrayed as flowing from a prior decision by Great Britain and France not to confront Hitler but to appease him, instead of examining in parallel the policy of these three powers towards Berlin, and their failure to coordinate their efforts. Thus, no integrated approach to the

\textsuperscript{27} The author would like to thank Jonathan Boff, lecturer at Birmingham University, for having pointed out this aspect in his feedback to an essay submitted as part of the course requirements for an MA in Second World War Studies.


\textsuperscript{29} “To be sure, U.S. officials believed that ‘objective’ history could also promote U.S. interests during the Cold War. Between 1948 and 1952, the Department of State and the Truman administration published historical documents to support their diplomatic objectives. In January 1948, as American and British scholars collaborated to publish captured German documents, the United States ‘caught [the Soviets] flat-footed in what was the first effective blow ... in a clear-cut propaganda war’ when it unilaterally published the inflammatory Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (among other embarrassing records) in Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941” Richard Humphrey to Francis Russell, quoted in Astrid Eckert, The Struggle for the Files: The Western Allies and the Return of German Archives after the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012; original German language publication 2004), p. 94.”, quoted by J. Botts, Chapter 7: “Out of the Frying Pan Into the Fire,” 1945-1957, in W. B. McAllister J. Botts, P. Cozzens, and A. W. Marrs, History of the Foreign Relations Series, (Washington: Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, 2014), available at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus-history/chapter-7#fn5

\textsuperscript{30} Falsificators of History (an historical note), (Moscow: Soviet Information Bureau, 1948), available at http://collections.mun.ca/PDFs/radical/FalsificatorsOfHistory.pdf
origins of the Second World War in Europe is provided by the standard explanation, which to a great extent dissects the war into two different conflicts which do not converge until Hitler attacks the USSR.

As explained in this paper, a comprehensive debate on the origins of the Second World War needs to take into account, among others, British and Soviet policies towards Nazi Germany, and this must include an examination of their ultimate rationales. Connected to this, any such debate must address the issue of why London and Moscow were not able to reach an understanding, including an examination of the factors discussed in this paper. We can thus answer our original question in the affirmative, while hoping for a more integrated historical scholarship which avoids looking at British, Soviet, or any other actor's actions in isolation and instead provides a comprehensive examination of the different policies and how they influenced each other.

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